Faked states attack exploiting detector efficiency mismatch on BB84, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols

Faked states attack exploiting detector efficiency mismatch on BB84, phase-time, DPSK, and Ekert protocols

poster by Vadim Makarov, Johannes Skaar and Andrey Anisimov
from Norwegian quantum cryptography group
presented on XI International Conference on Quantum Optics in Minsk, Belarus, May 26—31, 2006

The left half of the poster is based on quant-ph/0511032; the right half presents ideas now included into quant-ph/0702262.

You can download the poster: PDF (1.1MB) | JPEG (1.5MB)

Also, you can download a slide presentation with exactly the same content as the poster: PowerPoint (2.0MB; to see animations, run the presentation in the Slide Show mode) | PDF (1.7MB)

Errata
— In the rightmost column, in the description of the Ekert protocol, in the first equation labelled “Correlation coefficient”, all five instances of a_j should be a_i.
— In the rightmost column, in the description of faked states for the Ekert protocol, the numerical values of probabilities for sending them should be swapped. The correct probabilities are P_A = 0.59, P_B = 0.41.

Vadim Makarov